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MENS REA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
LUIS E. CHIESA*
This Essay compares and contrasts the American and civilian approaches
to mens rea. The comparative analysis generates two important insights. First,
it is preferable to have multiple forms of culpability than to have only two.
Common law bipartite distinctions such as general and specific intent fail to
fully make sense of our moral intuitions. The same goes for the civilian
distinction between dolus (intent) and culpa (negligence). Second, attitudinal
mental states should matter for criminalization and grading decisions.
Nevertheless, adding attitudinal mental states to our already complicated mens
rea framework may end up confusing juries instead of helping them. As a result,
jurisdictions without jury trials are better equipped to incorporate attitudinal
kinds of mens rea into their criminal laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nathan Hall made his way down a steep and bump-filled ski slope.1 The
Vail Mountain lift operator and former ski racer was skiing extremely fast with
his ski tips in the air and his weight back on his skis.2 In order to get an added
rush of adrenaline, Hall made his way down the slope without making any turns
and with his arms out to his side to maintain balance.3 Unfortunately, he flew
off a knoll and collided with a skier, killing him.4 Hall was charged with
reckless manslaughter.5 Before the trial commenced, defense counsel argued
that the charges should be dropped because the defendant acted merely
negligently.6
How much should we punish the defendant in the Hall case? While it is
criminal liability, it is unclear how much punishment is appropriate. Given that
punishment that should be imposed for the homicide will be entirely dependent
on his mental state. The more culpable his mental state, the more punishment
he should receive.7 This, in turn, requires inquiring about what mental states
should trigger the imposition of more (or less) criminal liability.
This Essay analyzes the Hall case from the perspectives of both American
and civilian criminal theory.8 The comparative analysis will reveal that these
1. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 211 12 (Colo. 2000).
2. Id. at 212.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 211.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. I will assume that this is true both from a retributivist and consequentialist approach to
punishment. Note, however, that a consequentialist may have reason to punish harm caused with
different mental states equally if doing so maximizes good consequences.
8. See infra pp. 578, 583. Civilian criminal law borrows heavily from German criminal law
theory. See GÜNTHER JAKOBS, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL: FUNDAMENTOS Y TEORIA DE LA
IIMPUTACIÓN (Joaquin Cuello Contreras & Jose Luis Serrano Gonzales de Murillo trans., Marcial Pons
2d ed. 1995). The civilian approach to criminal theory commands broad support throughout
continental Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia, including China and Japan. See, e.g., id.;
FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CONDE & MERCEDES GARCÍA ARÁN, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL (Tirant
Lo Blanch ed., 8th ed. 2010); DIEGO-MANUEL LUZÓN PEÑA, LECCIONES DE DERECHO PENAL: PARTE
GENERAL (Tirant Lo Blanch ed., 2d ed. 2012); SANTIAGO MIR PUIG, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE
GENERAL (7th ed. 2004); CLAUS ROXIN, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL (Diego Manuel Luzón
Peña et al. trans., Civitas 1st ed. 1997); EUGENIO RAÚL ZAFFARONI ET AL., DERECHO PENAL: PARTE
GENERAL (2nd ed., 2002); Félix A. Cifredo Cancel, La Intención y Otros Elementos Subjetivos del
Injusto Penal en los Sistemas Anglosajón y Civilista: Hacia Una Teoría Unitaria, 63 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
39 (1994).
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two legal traditions approach criminally culpable mental states in different
ways. Two particular differences stand out. First, civil law countries
distinguish only between dolus (intent) and culpa (negligence), whereas
American criminal law distinguishes between purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence.9 By only having recourse to two blameworthy
mental states, the civilian approach allows for less flexibility in grading and
criminalization decisions than the American approach. Second, culpable
mental states in civil law countries place more emphasis on the attitude and
volition with which the defendant acts, whereas American criminal law
downplays the importance of attitudinal and volitional mental states.
Both of these differences are likely to result in considerable disparities in
how much we punish homicide defendants like Nathan Hall. Regarding the
first, if we were to try Hall in a civil law jurisdiction, the case would result in a
conviction10 for homicide committed with dolus,11 or for homicide committed
with culpa.12 This leaves the factfinder with only two potential conviction
outcomes. On the other hand, prosecuting Hall in a state like Colorado could
lead to convictions for purposeful murder,13 knowing murder,14 reckless
manslaughter,15 or negligent manslaughter.16 The Colorado approach to
grading homicide which is prevalent in America allows for more conviction
outcomes than the civilian approach.
With regard to the second difference, the American approach to culpable
mental states punishes conscious risk creation considerably more than
unconscious risk creation. In contrast, civilian criminal theory focuses on
whether the defendant approached the risk created with a certain kind of
blameworthy attitude. On the other hand, American criminal law downplays

9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). These forms of culpability originate
in the Model Penal Code. See id. The older common law approach did not neatly define and distinguish
between different forms of culpability, instead relying on the conceptually bankrupt distinction
between general and specific intent crimes. See Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American
Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 335 (2007).
10. The result could also be an acquittal. For the purposes of this Essay, I only explore possible
conviction outcomes, since disparities in these potential outcomes highlight the different ways in which
American and civilian criminal law approach culpable mental states.
11. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 423. Civilian criminal law punishes a homicide committed with
dolus quite severely. Id.
12. See ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 549. Civilian criminal law punishes a homicide
committed with culpa way more leniently than one committed with dolus. Id.
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2015).
14. Id. § 18-3-103.
15. Id. § 18-3-104.
16. Id. § 18-3-105.
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the importance of attitudinal mental states, and instead focuses on the
awareness of certain facts as the determinant of more or less punishment.
In what follows, I explore the implications of these two competing
approaches to punishing culpable mental states. I conclude that it is preferable
to have multiple culpable mental states than to have only two. Bipartite
distinctions such as that between dolus and culpa fail to capture the many ways
in which blame manifests itself in our rich moral landscape. Furthermore, I
suggest that while attitudinal mental states ought to play a more salient role in
apportioning and grading punishment, such an approach is difficult to
implement in jurisdictions with jury trials.
The Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how the Hall case would
be decided in America, with special emphasis on how the defendant would fare
under the Model Penal Code approach to culpable mental states. Part II
explains how civilian jurisdictions would approach the case and fleshes out the
doctrinal distinctions that would prove decisive in those jurisdictions. Part III
uses comparative analysis to shed light on the most promising ways of
conceptualizing and sorting culpable mental states in homicide law and beyond.
A brief conclusion follows.
II. THE HALL CASE IN THE UNITED STATES
The defendant in the Hall case was tried in Colorado.17 Since the criminal
laws of Colorado are based on the Model Penal Code (MPC), the analysis that
follows is based on the framework for mental states and homicide offenses
provided in the MPC.18
A. The Model Penal Code Approach to Mental States
Prior to the publication of the MPC in 1962, American law revealed as
the Supreme Court pointed out in Morissette— variety, disparity and
the crime.19
invoke] terms [such] as
scienter
offenses.20

. . . [to
intent

intent
intent
mens rea
It is unclear what each of these terms mean and how they differ

17. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000).
18. The approach to the mental state in homicide cases in non-MPC jurisdictions is briefly
discussed in Part III(c).
19. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
20. Id.

2018]

MENS REA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

579

from each other, if they differ at all. At a minimum, these terms denote
conscious as opposed to inadvertent wrongdoing.
During the course of the twentieth century, many courts and commentators
expressed deep reservations about the cohere
to mental states.21 This dissatisfaction eventually blossomed into a desire to
mens rea in its entirety.22
A fresh start was clearly needed. And that is exactly what the MPC delivered.
The most influential provision of the MPC is arguably section 2.02, which
defines subjective offense elements. More than half of the states have adopted
mental state provisions modeled on the MPC framework, including Colorado.23
This provision does away with the myriad common law mens rea terms,
including notoriously difficult to define mental states like malice and general
and specific intent. The Code reduces subjective elements to four kinds of
culpability, namely: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.24
Furthermore, the MPC approach to mental states is hierarchical, since it
suggests that purpose is more blameworthy than knowledge, that knowledge is
more blameworthy than recklessness, and that recklessness is more
blameworthy than negligence.25 This hierarchical approach to mental states
allows for more granularity in the grading of criminal offenses. By allowing
offenses to be punished more or less severely depending on the mental state
with which the crime is committed, the Code allows for up to four distinct
grading schemes for each generic offense. This is most obviously the case in
homicide offenses. According to the Code, negligent homicide is punished less
severely than reckless homicide.26 In turn, purposeful and knowing homicides
are punished more severely than reckless homicide.27

21. Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
815 (1980).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 815 16. States that have modeled their criminal codes after the Model Penal Code
include: Illinois (1962); Minnesota and New Mexico (1963); New York (1967); Georgia (1969);
Kansas (1970); Connecticut (1971); Colorado and Oregon (1972); Delaware, Hawaii, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, and Utah (1973); Montana, Ohio, and Texas (1974), Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota,
and Virginia (1975); Arkansas, Maine, and Washington (1976); South Dakota and Indiana (1977);
Arizona and Iowa (1978); Missouri, Nebraska, and New Jersey (1979); Alabama and Alaska (1980);
and Wyoming (1983). See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 9, at 326. For Colorado s mental state
provisions, see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-502 to -503 (2012).
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
25. See id.
26. See id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
27. See id. § 210.
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Turning to the definitions of the four mental states, a person acts purposely
with regard to a result if it is her conscious desire to bring about the result.28 In
contrast, a person acts knowingly if she is aware that the result is practically
certain to occur as a consequence of her conduct.29 An example may better
illustrate the difference between purpose and knowledge under the Code.
Suppose that Matt places a bomb inside a commercial aircraft with the desire
to kill passenger Jessie. Although Matt does not desire anyone other than Jessie
to die, he is aware that all other airplane passengers will die when the bomb
explodes. The bomb explodes, killing all passengers instantly. Matt kills
passenger Jessie purposely, for it was his conscious desire to bring about her
death. However, Matt kills the rest of the passengers knowingly, since it was
not his conscious objective to bring about their death (he actually wanted them
to miraculously survive), but he knew that they were practically certain to die
if the bomb went off.
A person acts recklessly under the MPC if she is aware that her conduct
creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm.30 Contrary to what may
seem at first glance, a defendant may act recklessly even if her conduct is not
more likely than not to result in harm.31 More specifically, a defendant may be
held liable for a crime of recklessness even if the risk created by her conduct is
considerably lower than fifty percent and in spite of the fact that recklessness
32
Thus,
for example, a person who points a gun at another and spins the cylinder
knowing that only one of the six chambers of the gun contains a bullet acts
recklessly if she fires the gun and kills the victim, although the probability of
33
In addition to the creation of a substantial
risk, recklessness requires subjective awareness of the risk created.34
A person who lacks awareness of the risk does not act recklessly, although
she acts negligently if her conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
harm.35 The risk created in recklessness and negligence is the same. 36
Therefore, the only difference between the two mental states is that the reckless

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
See, e.g., People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 217 (Colo. 2000).
Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
Hall, 999 P.2d at 217.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
Id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d). In both cases the risk needs to be substantial and unjustifiable. Id.

2018]

MENS REA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

581

actor is aware that her conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk,
whereas the negligent actor is not.
Recklessness is a central concept in American criminal law, for it often
defines the limits between advertent and inadvertent wrongdoing.37 The
distinction is important, given that inadvertent (negligent) wrongdoing is
seldom criminalized.38 Moreover, in the few instances in which inadvertent
wrongdoing is punished, it is usually punished much less severely than
advertent wrongdoing.39 Most state jurisdictions exclude negligent wrongdoing
from punishment by prescribing a default culpability level that applies when no
mental state is referenced in the definition of the offense. According to section
2.02(3) of the MPC, for example, the default mental state is typically
recklessness.40 The practical import of this default rule is that criminal offenses
may not be committed negligently unless the definition of the offense expressly
states that negligence suffices for the imposition of criminal liability.
B. Applying the MPC Framework to the Hall Case
Hall created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.41 Furthermore, the
to the reasonable inference that he was aware of the possibility that by skiing
so fast and out of control he might collide with and kill another skier unless he
42
This, in turn, could lead to reasonable
fact finder to
and unjustifiable risk that by skiing exceptionally fast and out of control he
might [kill another skier]. 43 Given that there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant both created an

37. See id. § 2.02(2)(c).
38. Leslie Yalof Garfield, A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A
Prescription for the Legislature, 65 TENN. L. REV. 875, 879 (1998).
39. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10).
40. See id. § 2.02(3).
41. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 224 (Colo. 2000). The court concluded that the risk created
by the defendant was substantial although it is statistically unlikely that an out of control skier will
cause the death of a fellow skier. Id. at 222 23. The court reasoned that even slight risks are
substantial if the magnitude of the interest that is put at risk is significant. Id. at 224. Given that the
interest that the defendant s conduct put at risk of harm (life) was significant, the court concluded that
a slight risk of harm to an interest of significant magnitude was substantial for the purposes of a
finding of recklessness. Id.
42. Id. at 223.
43. Id. at 224.
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unjustifiable risk of death and was aware of the risk, he could be found guilty
of reckless manslaughter as the crime is defined in the MPC and Colorado.44
In terms of the actual punishment that could be imposed on Hall, the
Colorado homicide grading scheme nicely illustrates the MPC hierarchical
approach to mental states.45 Since purposeful and knowing killings are all
things considered more blameworthy than reckless killings, the former are
punished more than the latter.46 Furthermore, given that reckless killings are
generally considered to be more worthy of condemnation than negligent
killings, recklessly causing death is punished more severely than causing the
same harm negligently.47 More specifically, purposeful or knowing murder in
Colorado could be punished with up to twelve years of imprisonment, whereas
reckless manslaughter could be punished with up to four years of
imprisonment.48 In turn, negligent homicide could be punished with up to two
years of imprisonment.49
III. THE HALL CASE IN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
In order to determine how much the defendant in the Hall case would be
punished in a civil law jurisdiction, one must ascertain whether he acted
intentionally or negligently. The civilian approach to mental states is binary.
That is, it typically recognizes only two mental states for the purposes of

44. Id. While the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the defendant could be properly
charged with reckless manslaughter and that a reasonable juror could find that he acted recklessly, the
jury that eventually decided his fate convicted him of negligent manslaughter instead. Colorado Skier
Is Convicted in Fatal Collision on Slopes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at A9. Given that the risk
created in reckless and negligent manslaughter is defined in exactly the same manner, the most logical
inference that can be drawn from the verdict is that the jury concluded that the defendant was not aware
that his conduct created a risk of death. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d). Had he been aware of
the risk of death, the jury should have convicted him of reckless manslaughter, since it clearly found
that the objective risk created by his conduct was substantial and unjustified under the criminal laws
of Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2015). Note that given the preliminary stage of the
proceedings when the Hall case reached the state high court, the court merely concluded that a
reasonable juror could find that the defendant was aware of the risk of death he created. Hall, 999 P.2d
at 224. Eventually, however, the jury could also end up finding that the defendant was not aware of
the risk created, which is perhaps what happened in this case. Id. Given that the jury does not have to
explain the grounds for its verdict, the precise rationale for the verdict will never be known.
45. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-102 to -105.
46. See id. §§ 18-3-102 to -104.
47. See id. §§ 18-3-104 to -105.
48. See id. §§ 18-3-102 to -104.
49. See id. § 18-3-105.
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calibrating punishment.50 The most blameworthy mental state is that of intent
or dolus.51 The less blameworthy mental state is that of negligence or culpa.52
There are three kinds of intent or dolus, whereas there are two types of
negligence or culpa.53 Intent can be either direct or indirect.54 Furthermore,
direct intent or dolus can be either of the first or second degree.55 A person acts
with direct intent of the first degree when it is her goal or conscious objective
to bring about the offense.56
under the MPC. In contrast, a person acts with direct intent of the second degree
when she does not desire the offense to take place, but she knows that bringing
about the offense is a necessary consequence of her conduct.57 This is
58
Finally, a person acts
with indirect intent when she is aware that her conduct creates an unjustifiable
risk of harm.59 In addition to this awareness, acting with indirect intent has
traditionally required a certain kind of attitude with regard to the risk created.60
In civilian jurisdictions, indirect intent is considered the most watered-down
form of intentional conduct and
dolus eventualis 61
There is no consensus regarding the kind of attitude that is relevant for dolus
eventualis. For some, the actor must convince herself that she would act even
if the consequence of the act is producing the proscribed harm.62 The actor thus
awareness. For others, what matters is indifference rather than acceptance.
According to this view, a defendant acts with dolus eventualis if she is aware
that her conduct creates an unjustifiable risk of harm and she is indifferent as
to whether the harm takes place.63

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
harm. Id.
63.

See, e.g., CÓDIGO PENAL § 1 arts. 5, 10 (2015).
See ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 444.
Id.
ROXIN, supra note 8, at 417, 423, 424.
Id.
Id.
JAKOBS, supra note 8, at 321.
See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 423.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425.
CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 271.
Id.; ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425 n.25.
See PEÑA, supra note 8, at 246. This is the theory of acceptance or acquiescence to the
Id. at 250.
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In contrast, a defendant who is aware that her conduct creates a risk of harm
but is not indifferent to it acts with what civilian scholars call conscious
negligence.64 In such cases, the defendant actually believes that the harm will
not transpire because she trusts that she will be able to prevent it by making use
of special skills or knowledge.65 Therefore, the difference between a defendant
who acts with dolus eventualis and one who acts with conscious negligence is
not whether she is aware of the risks created by her conduct. The difference
lies in the attitude that the defendant adopts towards the risk that she creates.
In cases of dolus eventualis, the actor is not confident that she will be able to
prevent the harm from taking place, and she does not care whether it
materializes or not. On the other hand, in cases of conscious negligence, the
defendant is confident that she will be able to prevent the harm that is risked by
her conduct.
The following table illustrates the differences between the civilian mental
states of dolus eventualis and conscious negligence and the common law mental
state of recklessness:
Mental State

Awareness of
risk created

Indifference
towards harm
taking place

Recklessness

Yes

Irrelevant

Trust in ability
to prevent
harm from
materializing
Irrelevant

Yes
No

No
Yes

Dolus Eventualis Yes
Conscious
Yes
Negligence

Differentiating dolus eventualis from conscious negligence is essential to
discriminating between intentional and negligent conduct in civil law countries,
for dolus eventualis is considered the most watered-down form of intent,
whereas conscious negligence is considered a type of negligence.
Consequently, the difference between acting with dolus eventualis or conscious
negligence is of significant practical import. This is because in civilian
jurisdictions, negligent conduct usually remains unpunished.66 Furthermore,
when negligent wrongdoing is criminalized, it is typically punished
significantly less than intentional wrongdoing.67
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 306.
Id.
See, e.g., ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 549.
See, e.g., id.

2018]

MENS REA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

585

As a result, the actual punishment that would be imposed in the Hall case
deemed intentional or
negligent. He would receive more punishment if he is found to have acted with
dolus eventualis (a type of intentional conduct) than if he is found to have acted
with conscious negligence (a kind of negligence). Note that whether the
defendant will be punished more or less severely does not entirely depend on
whether he was aware of the risk or not. Even if he was aware that his conduct
created a risk of death, he may be found guilty of negligent homicide under a
conscious negligence theory if he was not indifferent to causing death.68
Although it is unclear whether the defendant in Hall was indifferent to the
First,
the defendant seemed fairly confident in his skiing ability and, therefore, in his
ability to prevent the harm from taking place.69 Second, skier on skier
collisions that result in death are extremely rare.70 Therefore, it is very likely
that the defendant felt quite confident that a death would not result in spite of
the risky nature of his conduct. As a result, the evidence probably supports an
inference that the defendant trusted that he would not kill a person while he was
making his way down the slope. This suggests that the defendant acted with
conscious negligence rather than dolus eventualis. If so, the defendant could
be convicted of negligent homicide even if the trier of fact is convinced that he
was aware that his conduct created an unjustifiable risk of death.71
IV. THE HALL CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Placing the Hall case in comparative perspective yields at least two
interesting insights. First, the MPC approach to mental states allows for more
granularity in the grading of criminal offenses than the civilian approach to
subjective offense elements. The hierarchical or tiered MPC approach
(purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence) affords more flexibility in
gradating punishment than the binary (intent or negligence) civil law approach.
Second, the MPC approach to mental states places more emphasis on cognitive
mental states, whereas the civil law approach emphasizes volitional or
attitudinal mental states. As we will see, however, the MPC approach to mental
states is sometimes supplemented by more attitudinal or volitional mental
states, especially in the context of homicide. In contrast, an increasing number
of courts and scholars in civilian jurisdictions are downplaying the attitudinal
68.
69.
70.
71.

See PEÑA, supra note 8, at 306.
See People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 223 (Colo. 2000).
Id. at 212.
PEÑA, supra note 8, at 306.
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features of mental states and redefining them in mostly cognitive terms.72 Both
legal systems may thus be moving in different directions. While American
scholars sometimes flirt with giving more prominence to attitudinal mental
states, civil law scholars increasingly highlight the importance of cognitive
mental states.73
A. Binary vs. Multinary Approaches to Mental States
As I point out in the previous section, the civilian approach to mental states
is binary, allowing only for convictions based on either intent or negligence.74
Although the scholarly literature in civil law countries recognizes up to three
types of intent (direct intent in the first and second degree and indirect intent or
dolus eventualis) and two kinds of negligence (conscious and unconscious),
only two grading scales are typically applied. Therefore, if a defendant acts
with any of the three kinds of intent or dolus, she may be convicted of
intentional homicide. If she acted with one of the two kinds of culpa, she may
be convicted of negligent homicide. The difference in punishment between
these two crimes is significant. Note that there is no third option. The conduct
is either intentional and severely punished, or negligent and punished
considerably less.
In contrast, the MPC approach to mental states is, for lack of a better word,
75
Instead of forcing the conduct into one of two categories (intent
vs. negligence), the MPC allows for up to four different grading scales based
on whether the defendant acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently.76 In principle, then, the defendant in the Hall case could be
convicted of purposeful homicide, knowing homicide, reckless homicide, or
negligent homicide. Punishment would decrease as one moves from purpose
72. See CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 267; see also ROXIN, supra note 8, at 439.
73. ROXIN, supra note 8, at 439.
74. Thomas Weigend, Subjective Elements of Criminal Liability, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 490, 499 500 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2016).
75. Weigend calls the MPC approach to mental states tripartite because it lumps purpose and
knowledge together for the purposes of punishment and recognizes two additional categories of
punishment based on recklessness and negligence, respectively. Id. at 499. He does so in contrast to
the civilian system, which he describes as being based on the intent/negligence dichotomy. Id. at
499 500. While Weigend is right to point out that the MPC approach to mens rea is not based on a
dichotomy similar to the intent/negligence distinction, it is not entirely accurate to describe the MPC
approach as tripartite. Id. The description is inaccurate because the MPC does not always lump
purpose and punishment together for the purposes of punishment. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10).
As a result, it sometimes functions as a quadripartite system. Id. § 2.02. Furthermore, the MPC quite
often lumps purpose, knowledge, and recklessness together, thus creating a bipartite system. Id.
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
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to knowledge to recklessness to negligence. Of course, jurisdictions are free to
lump two or more of these mental states together, thus creating three or fewer
grading scales. Thus, for example, the MPC generally discriminates between
negligent homicide, reckless homicide, and purposeful/knowing homicide.77
Negligent homicide is punished less than all other forms of homicide, whereas
reckless homicide is typically punished less than purposeful or knowing
homicide.78 The result is the creation of three basic grading scales for homicide
based on mental states (purpose/knowledge, recklessness, and negligence).79
The upshot of this approach is that it allows for better calibration of the
appropriate punishment in cases like Hall. While in the binary civil law
approach to mental states the defendant can only be convicted of intentional
(more punishment) or negligent (less punishment) homicide, in the multinary
approach to mental states adopted in the MPC, the defendant can be convicted
of purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent homicide, with punishment
decreasing as you move from purpose to negligence.
It is important to distinguish between binary and multinary for both
conceptual and pragmatic reasons. From a conceptual point of view,
overlooking the distinction between binary and multinary approaches to mental
states may generate a mistake commonly made by those who try to compare the
MPC mental states with the general framework for mental states in civil law
jurisdictions. The common mistake is to lump the MPC mental states into the
civilian binary intent/negligence distinction.80 More specifically, one could
claim that what civil law scholars define as dolus (intent) is essentially the same
ecklessness
into one category. The remaining MPC mental state negligence would then
comprise the mental state of culpa. While this seems to work at first glance,
intent/negligence
multinary approach into a binary framework that lumps together purpose,
knowledge, and recklessness and contrasts it with a residual category of

77. Id. §§ 210.2 .4.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 210.2. The MPC also punishes reckless killings that reveal gross indifference to the
value of human life as severely as purposeful/knowing killings. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES, Part II, vol. 1, § 210.2 comment 4 at 21 22 (1980). Furthermore, it mitigates
purposeful/knowing murders to manslaughter if the killing takes place as a result of extreme emotional
disturbance (EED). EED amounts to a partial excuse that mitigates murder to manslaughter without
actually negating the existence of the basic mental state of purpose or knowledge. See id.
80. See, e.g., Cifredo Cancel, supra note 8, at 44.
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negligence.
approach to mens rea on its
head.
For similar reasons, it may also be misleading to equate the civil law mental
states of direct intent of the first- and second-degree with purpose and
knowledge and the mental state of dolus eventualis with recklessness. Doing
so is problematic because both first- and second-degree direct intent and dolus
eventualis are simply different versions of the same mental element intent.81
In contrast, purpose, knowledge, and recklessness are not three versions of a
more general mental element, but rather three distinct mental states, each with
potentially different implications for grading criminal offenses.82
Distinguishing between binary and multinary approaches to mental states
may also generate important practical differences in how cases are dealt with.
Since civilian jurisdictions think about mental states in binary fashion, dealing
with difficult fact patterns like the one presented by the Hall case is tricky. The
two options presented by the binary system are likely to prove unattractive to
many. Viewing the defendant as acting intentionally would arguably lead to
punishing him too much.
merely negligent could arguably generate too little punishment. As a result, the
binary approach may end up either over punishing or under punishing the
defendant in the Hall case. In contrast, a multinary approach to mens rea like
the one adopted in the MPC may be better at avoiding over and under punishing,
since it allows for three or more grading scales depending on the mental state
that the defendant is found to have acted with.
B. Attitudinal v. Cognitive Approaches to Mental States
The MPC and civilian approaches to mens rea also differ in how much they
emphasize attitudinal or cognitive mental states. Mental states in civil law
countries have a very strong attitudinal component. In contrast, the MPC
emphasizes cognitive mental states more than attitudinal ones.
The textbook definition of intent in civil law countries includes two
components.
result.83
to make use of volitional capabilities in
the offense.84
order to achieve a desired end.85 As discussed previously, civil law jurisdictions
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 267.
Id.
Id. at 269.
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distinguish between three different kinds of intent. The volitional component
of the first kind of intent direct dolus of the first degree is clear, given that
acting with this mental state implies having the purpose of committing the
offense.86 It is more difficult to find a volitional component in the other two
kinds of intent. Acting with direct dolus of the second degree implies being
aware that the offense is practically certain to occur.87 As defined, volition is
absent in this kind of mental state.88 Awareness of the practical certainty of the
existence of a given state of affairs is a cognitive rather than a conative mental
state. However, the majority of civil law commentators construe this mental
state as a kind of intent that has a volitional component. The views of Claus
Roxin
are representative:
Acting with dolus directus of the second degree implies
offense is unpleasant to the actor. The consequences of the
conduct that the actor believes are practically certain to occur
are considered part of the age
absolutely no interest in those consequences.89
The idea underlying the inference of volition in these cases is that one
one wants or desires. Whether this assumption is warranted is discussed later.90
At this stage, however, what matters is that civil law courts and scholars go out
of their way to find volition in this mental state.91
If finding volition in dolus directus of the second degree is tricky, finding
it in dolus eventualis is even trickier. It is clear from the civilian scholarly
literature that at least in theory the three types of intent or dolus imply
92
This, of course, includes dolus
eventualis.
she is only aware that her conduct creates a substantial risk that the offense may
take place? Cognition does not imply volition.93 The way in which civil law
courts and scholars get around this is by supplementing the cognitive element
of dolus eventualis with an additional attitudinal element.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See supra p. 583.
See supra p. 583.
See supra p. 583.
ROXIN, supra note 8, at 424.
See infra p. 591.
ROXIN, supra note 8, at 424.
See infra pp. 590 91.
PUIG, supra note 8, at 261, 268.
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The result is that acting with dolus eventualis requires not only awareness
of the risk created by the conduct, but also evincing a certain kind of attitude
toward the possible commission of the offense.94 As was discussed previously,
there is no consensus regarding the kind of attitude that the defendant must
display in order to act with dolus eventualis. Some courts and commentators
assert that the additional mental element is satisfied if the actor would have
engaged in the conduct even if she knew that the act was going to result in the
commission of the offense.95 This version of dolus eventualis is frequently
she would proceed in the same way had she known that
her conduct would result in the offense.96
Supplementing the cognitive element of dolus eventualis with a mental state
dolus closer to having a volitional
component. By acquiescing to the commission of the offense, the actor reveals
that she would be willing to commit an offense if that is what achieving her
goal requires.97 Admittedly, this mental state is not volitional in the same kind
dolus
However, the mental state of acceptance is not purely cognitive either, as it
implies something more than mere knowledge or awareness of the risk. At the
very least, acquiescence to the risk in the sense required by the acceptance
theory of dolus eventualis adds an attitudinal mental state that can be contrasted
with the purely cognitive mental state of awareness of the risk.
Some courts and scholars believe that the acceptance theory goes too far,
for few defendants who engage in risky conduct would accept that they would
engage in such conduct if they knew that the conduct would result in an
offense.98 Instead of acceptance, they argue that the cognitive element of dolus
eventualis should be supplemented by a mental state of indifference. 99 Under
this theory, acting with dolus eventualis would entail both being aware of the
risk created by the conduct and being indifferent to whether the conduct brings
about the commission of an offense.100 The mental state of indifference seems
even more removed from volition than the mental state of acceptance. To be
indifferent to an outcome is not the same as desiring that outcome.
Nevertheless, the mental state of indifference is not purely cognitive either, as

94. See infra p. 591 92.
95. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425.
96. Id. at 430.
97. Id. at 431.
98. See infra p. 591 92.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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it demonstrates that the defendant has a certain kind of attitude towards the risk
that she is creating.
In sum, supplementing the cognitive mental state of awareness of the risk
with a mental state such as acceptance or indifference adds a non-cognitive
dimension to dolus eventualis. Although it is a stretch to state as civil law
scholars often do that mental states like acceptance and indifference reflect
volition, it is accurate to assert that such mental states add an attitudinal
component to dolus eventualis that is generally absent in the imperfect AngloAmerican analogue to dolus eventualis (recklessness).
This emphasis on attitudes constitutes one of the distinguishing features of
the civilian approach to mental states.
certain non-cognitive mental state, whether it be purpose (direct dolus of the
first degree), assumption of the consequences (direct dolus of the second
degree), or indifference (dolus eventualis).101 In contrast, to act with culpa is
to act with a different, nonperceive the harm (unconscious negligence).102 The civilian approach leads to
different grading sca
If the defendant is indifferent to the harm,
103
she will be punished quite severely. However, if she is merely aware of the
harm but not indifferent to it, she will be punished considerably less severely
even if she is aware of the risk.104
can be contrasted with the more cognitive approach to mental states that was
adopted in many American states after the publication of the MPC. According
to the MPC, actors who are aware of the risk that their conduct creates are
generally punished much more than actors who are unaware of the risk that their
conduct creates.105 Awareness and non-awareness marks the difference
between recklessness and negligence.106 The latter is punished often and
considerably, while the former is punished infrequently and more leniently.
Contrary to what is the case in civil law countries, as long as the actor is aware
of the risk she creates, it is generally irrelevant to liability whether she is
101. Id. at 417, 423, 425.
102. ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 549.
103. Defendant in this case would be punished for an intentional offense based on dolus
eventualis.
104. Defendant in this case would be punished for a negligent offense based on a theory of
conscious negligence.
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2 210.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
106. Id. § 2.02(c), (d).
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indifferent to the risk or not.107 The emphasis is on cognitive mental states
rather than on attitudinal ones.
Comparison of the civilian and MPC views of mental states raises an
important question for criminal punishment. Should we focus on cognitive or
attitudinal mental states when making basic punishment decisions on the basis
of culpability? By and large, civil law countries make basic punishment
distinctions based on attitudinal mental states such as indifference or lack of
indifference. In contrast, the MPC generally makes such punishment decisions
based on cognitive criteria such as awareness or lack of awareness of a risk.
C. Convergence in MPC and Civilian Approaches to Mental States
While the trend in the United States is to emphasize cognitive mental states,
there are some instances in which attitudinal mental states are emphasized. By
the same token, while most civil law courts and scholars generally focus on
attitudinal mental states in order to make basic punishment decisions, some
commentators and courts are advocating for a more cognitive approach to
mental states.108
The most glaring instance in which American criminal law makes use of
attitudinal mental states to make basic grading distinctions in criminal offenses
is in the law of murder.
109
In the context of the
killing of a human being
common law definition of murder, a prosecutor may prove malice by showing
that the defendant had:
(1) intent to kill;
(2) intent to cause serious bodily injury;
ce to the value of
human life; or by proving
(4) felony murder.110
The most problematic kind of malice is that of so-called depraved heart
murder. The problem arises because it is difficult to distinguish between
reckless killings that do not evince a depraved heart and reckless killings that
do. While the latter would be classified as murder, the former would only give
rise to liability for manslaughter.111 As one court observed, the kind of
recklessness that triggers liability for depraved heart murder is frequently
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Indifference does seem to be relevant to a murder charge under the MPC. See supra p. 588.
See generally PUIG, supra note 8, at 259 70.
Simpkins v. State, 596 A.2d 655, 661 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
Id. at 657.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2(1)(b), 210.3(1)(b).
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described as conduct that reveals extreme indifference to human life.112
should] realize the risk his behavior has created to the extent that his conduct
113
may be termed w
of viciousness or contemptuous disregard for the value of human life which
114
The issue has vexed courts
for decades.
One court explained that the difference between depraved heart
recklessness and standard recklessness is that depraved heart murder involves
a higher degree of recklessness from which malice or deliberate design may be
implied.115 Ultimately, it appears that depraved heart murders are simply
equated with purposeful killings in terms of blameworthiness. A more specific
definition is, however, elusive.
Even if a precise definition of depraved heart murder eludes us, it is clear
that this mental state may allow for attitudinal considerations that are otherwise
irrelevant under the purely cognitive mental state of recklessness. Depraved
plus
the basic awareness of risk that characterizes simple recklessness with an
attitudinal mental state of indifference. The similarities between the common
law mental state of depraved heart and the civil law mental state of dolus
eventualis are undeniable.
Although the MPC eschews malice from its definition of murder, the kinds
of killings that may give rise to murder liability under the Code are quite similar
to those that would give rise to murder liability at common law. The MPC
defines murder as purposely or knowingly killing a human being. 116
Interestingly, it is also murder to recklessly kill a human being in circumstances
that manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life. 117 The MPC s
inclusion of this mental state (recklessness plus gross indifference) stands out,
as section 2.02 only recognizes four mental states (purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, and negligently).118

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Simpkins, 596 A.2d at 657.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2.
Id.
See id. § 2.02.
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The line between standard recklessness and recklessness with gross
indifference to human life is fuzzy. That the line is difficult to draw in this
context is worrying, given that purely reckless killings amount to the lesser
offense of manslaughter, whereas reckless killings with gross indifference
amount to the much more serious offense of murder.119 The drafters of the MPC
suggest that the difference between these two mental states is normative. 120
Reckless killings should trigger murder liability if the circumstances
surrounding the act suggest that the killing is as worthy of condemnation as a
purposeful or knowing killing. In contrast, the killing should be considered
manslaughter if the circumstances surrounding the act reveal that it is not as
blameworthy as purposeful and knowing killings.121
state of recklessness supplemented by gross indifference to the value of human
life shares many features of the civil law mental state of dolus eventualis. More
specifically, it reveals an openness to give more weight to attitudinal mental
states than what section 2.02 of the Code would suggest, at least in the context
of very serious offenses such as murder.122 Some scholars celebrate this
attitudinal component of depraved heart murder and suggest that the element of
indifference should be the cornerstone of homicide offenses.123 Others argue
that the attitudinal model that is highlighted by depraved heart murder should
be extended to other contexts.124 It is unclear whether this emphasis on
attitudinal mental states will spread to offenses other than murder. If it does, it
will bring the Anglo-American and civilian approaches to mental states closer
together.
Interestingly, while some American criminal theorists call for a more
widespread use of the attitudinal approach to mental states that lies at the heart
of depraved murder, a growing number of civil law scholars are arguing for a
rejection of attitudinal mental states.125 In recent years the civil law distinction
between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence is being called into
119. See id. §§ 210.2 210.3.
120. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II, vol. 1 § 210.2 comment 4 at 21
22 (1980).
121. See id. at 22.
122. The Code also makes reference to recklessness with gross indifference in the crime of
assault and battery. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a).
123. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Criminal Homicide Statutes: Giving Juries More
Discretion, 47 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 89, 97 98 (2014).
124. Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 961
(1998).
125. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 435.
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question.126 The charge is led mostly by the civilian courts and scholars that
defend the so-called probability theory of dolus eventualis.127 According to this
theory, a defendant acts with dolus eventualis when she accurately perceives
the danger created by her conduct and acts in spite of having such awareness.128
In contrast, a defendant acts with conscious negligence when she fails to
correctly assess the danger created by her conduct.129 In its most extreme
version, the theory leads to a finding of intent whenever the actor is aware that
her conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm. Many scholars throughout
the civil law realm have endorsed a version of this theory of dolus eventualis.130
Some courts are starting to follow suit.131 If this trend continues, the differences
between the civil law mental state of dolus eventualis
state of recklessness will become less meaningful.
D. Competing Approaches to Mental States: Expressing Autonomy vs.
Controlling Risk
Why do civilian legal traditions focus more on attitudinal mental states than
the Anglo-American jurisdictions influenced by the more cognitive MPC
approach? Why do civil law countries approach mental states in binary fashion,
whereas the MPC prefers a multinary approach to subjective offense elements?
One way of answering these questions is by positing that the civil law
approach to mental states is primarily concerned with expressing autonomy,
while the MPC approach is primarily concerned with controlling or minimizing
risk. It is difficult to make sense of civilian criminal law theory without taking
into account the significant role that autonomy plays in the system. As a result,
it is often stated in civil law jurisdictions that the legitimacy of criminal law is
to a significant extent dependent on whether doctrines of criminal law respect
individual autonomy.132 Take, for example, the civil law approach to
criminalization. Most civilian scholars argue that it is legitimate to criminalize
conduct only if doing so is necessary to protect so-called legal goods.133 Legal
126. See, e.g., id.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. See PUIG, supra note 8, at 267 68.
129. Id.
130. In Spain, see for example, id. at 267 68, 267 n.75, 268 nn.76 77. In Germany, see for
example JAKOBS, supra note 8, at 329.
131. Spanish courts, for example, seem to be slowly moving in this direction. See PUIG, supra
note 8, at 278, 278 n.104.
132. See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere Non Potest? A German Perspective, 6 J.
INT L CRIM. JUST. 927, 937 (2008).
133. CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 59.

596

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[102:575

goods are often defined as those interests that are necessary for human beings
134
That is, conduct should be criminalized
135

act and the
harm suffered by the victim because by doing so we recognize the victim as an
autonomous agent who is free to decide whether to engage in risky conduct.136
The civilian approach to the necessity or lesser evils defense also significantly
emphasizes autonomy. Therefore, it is typically considered unlawful in civil
law jurisdictions to sacrifice the interests of an individual in order to increase
the welfare of an even greater number of people because doing so obliterates
the autonomy of the sacrificed individual.137 In doing so, we objectify the
individual by treating her as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself.
This is considered illegitimate because it negates individual autonomy. A final
example is the general skepticism with which corporate criminal liability is met
in civil law jurisdictions. Imposing criminal liability on corporate actors is
often viewed as inappropriate because corporations are not capable of behaving
culpably since they are not moral agents endowed with the capacity for making
autonomous choices.138
In contrast to the civil law autonomy-centered approach to criminal justice,
the MPC emphasizes control and mitigation of risky conduct over the protection
of autonomy.139 Therefore, it is often viewed as legitimate to criminalize risk
conduct.140
conduct is often ignored in the proximate causation analysis in order to hold the
defendant liable. Although this approach to causation downplays the
from proposing risky endeavors that are of little social value.141 AngloAmerican criminal law is also much more open to sacrificing an individual in
order to maximize the welfare of many others.142 Once again, the emphasis in
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 59.
138. Weigend, supra note 132, at 936.
139. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
140. See, e.g., id.
141. This is what we do when we criminalize risky conduct such as playing Russian roulette.
142. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 49 (1881
eady
to sacrifice the individual so far as necessary in order to accomplish [its purpose]).
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these cases is placed on minimizing risks to others rather than on protecting
autonomy. Finally, corporate criminal liability is readily accepted in common
law jurisdictions as the driving force behind punishing corporate actors is to
deter corporations from engaging in risky conduct rather than expressing
condemnation for the autonomous choices of the corporation.143
It is in this context that the differences between the civil and common law
approaches to mental states can best be explained. The civilian model of mens
rea is primarily concerned with expressing condemnation for autonomously
and voluntarily choosing to do wrong. As a result, punishment is primarily
imposed for choosing to do wrong rather than for consciously risking wrong.
This explains the binary nature of the civil law approach to mental states. An
individual either chooses to do wrong or not. When it comes to choosing, there
is no middle ground. I can choose to drive to work, get married, or buy a gun.
, or buy
a gun. In conventional language, choice is binary. Either you choose to do
something, or you do not.144 This, in turn, explains why punishment in civil
law jurisdictions is meted out solely on the basis of the binary intent/negligence
distinction. Intentional wrongdoing is punished more because it reveals freely
chosen wrongdoing.145 On the other hand, negligent wrongdoing is punished
less because the negligent actor has not chosen to do harm.146
The conceptual structure of choice also explains the attitudinal nature of the
civil law approach to mental states. To choose X is not merely to know or be
aware of X. In addition of awareness of the thing that one is choosing, to choose
kind of way. I choose to eat a
cheeseburger not only because I am aware of the cheeseburger. In addition to
such awareness, choosing to eat the burger entails exercising my will so as to
make the affirmative decision of eating it. Similarly, an actor who is aware that
a person may die has not necessarily chosen to kill that person. In addition, the
actor must exercise her will in a certain kind of way in order for it to be said
Given that the civil law approach to mental
states punishes actors for choosing wrongdoing and that the conceptual
143. Weigend, supra note 132, at 928, 943.
144. I define choice in Aristotelian terms. If the actor can do more than one thing, the actor has
a choice even if the choice is unattractive or is the product of duress. Thus, a coerced actor who kills
an innocent person in order to avoid being killed chooses to kill in spite of the coercion. That is, she
could have chosen to die instead of saving herself by killing an innocent person. The problem in these
cases is not that the actor lacks choice. Instead, the problem is that the coercer has unjustifiably and
unattractively reduced the actor s choices.
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
146. See id. § 210.4.
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structure of choosing entails the presence of non-cognitive mental states, the
civil law approach to mental states is appropriately described as attitudinal.
On the other hand, th
mens rea focuses on cognitive
mental states because it strives primarily to punish culpable risk creation rather
than defective choice making.147 The logic of choice plays little to no role in
the MPC model of mental states for the same reason that the MPC generally
favors rules that foster risk control and minimization over victim or offender
autonomy.148 The chief aims of the drafters of the Code were to identify and
incapacitate dangerous offenders and to deter would-be offenders from
engaging in future wrongdoing.149 Punishing primarily for conscious risk
creation advances both of these aims. On one hand, those who consciously
create risks of harm reveal themselves as dangerous and in need of correction.
On the other hand, the criminal law ought to be designed in a way that deters
people from engaging in conduct that consciously creates risks of harm.
Whether such riskreally relevant under this model. Their dangerousness is revealed by their
conscious risk-taking regardless of their attitude toward the risk. As a result,
the MPC approach to mens rea emphasizes cognitive mental states such as
awareness over non-cognitive or attitudinal mental states such as indifference
or acceptance.
mens rea can also be explained by the
-minimization.150 Actors can be aware of many
different risks. Furthermore, actors who are aware of a certain type of risk are
sometimes more dangerous or in need of more deterrence than those who are
aware of a different kind of risk. As a result, the MPC approach to mens rea
punishes different kinds of awareness in different ways, thus giving rise to a
multinary approach to mens rea. Being aware that conduct creates a substantial
risk of death (recklessness) is different than being aware that conduct will
certainly cause death (knowledge). The different awareness in these cases is
sometimes the basis for imposing differential punishment.151
In sum, the civil law approach to mens rea revolves around the idea of
autonomous choice. Choosing to engage in wrongdoing is deserving of more
punishment than not choosing to engage in wrongdoing. The civilian
preference for punishing choice is the product of a system of criminal justice
that prizes respecting autonomy over minimizing or controlling risk. This view
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id. § 2.02.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
See, e.g., id. §§ 210.3 210.4.
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of criminal law as a vehicle for expressing and respecting autonomous choice
explains why civil law approaches to mental states are generally both binary
and attitudinal.
Contrarily, the MPC approach to mental states prioritizes risk minimization
over reaffirming the autonomy of the victim or offender. This view is the
product of a criminal justice system that aims primarily to maximize deterrence
of dangerous activities. This preference for maximizing deterrence and
mens rea model is primarily cognitive
and multinary.
E. Mental States in Comparative Perspective: Moving Forward
As the previous discussion shows, MPC and civil law approaches to mental
states differ significantly in at least two ways. First, civil law jurisdictions favor
a binary approach to mental states that allows for only two basic grading scales
based on mens rea. So-called intentional crimes are punished considerably,
whereas so-called negligent crimes are punished significantly less. In contrast,
the United States is moving toward what I have called a multinary approach
that allows for up to four basic grading scales based on mens rea. Second, civil
law jurisdictions tend to focus more on attitudinal mental states that
discriminate between more and less severe grading scales based on whether the
defendant displayed certain attitudes towards the risks that she created. In
contrast, the MPC focuses more on cognitive mental states in order to make
basic grading distinctions. What can be learned from these divergent
approaches to mental states? Does one model work better in some
circumstances but not in others? This concluding section addresses these
questions.
F. In Defense of a Multinary Approach to Mental States
A multinary approach to mental states is preferable to a binary approach.
There are both conceptual and normative reasons for preferring the multinary
approach.
From a descriptive perspective, the binary distinction of intent (dolus) and
negligence (culpa) describes certain mental states as intentional when doing so
is conceptually confusing. Intentional conduct is purposive conduct. While
what civil law scholars call dolus directus of the first degree entails purposive
conduct, the other two kinds of dolus do not.152 This is especially the case with
dolus eventualis, as being aware of a risk of harm or being indifferent to its
consummation is simply not the same as wanting its consummation. Claiming

152. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 417, 423, 424.
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otherwise as most civil law courts and scholars do is confusing.
Furthermore and more importantly nothing is gained by calling dolus
eventualis a kind of intentional conduct other than forcing this mental state into
one of the two mental states in the binary intent/culpa distinction. As the MPC
approach to mental states illustrates, there is conceptual breathing space for
mental states other than intent and negligence. As a result, it would be better
to simply recognize that dolus eventualis is neither a kind of intent nor a kind
of negligence. It is its own mental state that is conceptually distinct from both
intent and negligence.
Normatively, the multinary approach is also preferable to the binary
approach. All things being equal, purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence lie on a continuum of blameworthiness ranging from the most
blameworthy mental state (purpose) to the mental state worthy of less
condemnation (negligence).153 If these mental states lie on a continuum of
blameworthiness, it would be preferable to allow for differential punishment
of lumping two or more of these mental states together to create a binary
approach to mental states that affords less flexibility in making basic grading
distinctions.
The Hall case illustrates this quite nicely. In terms of describing the
victim. The defendant obviously did not have the purpose of killing anyone
when he was schussing down the ski slope. Even if the defendant was aware
that his conduct created a risk of death or serious bodily injury, it would be a
stretch to describe this mental state as intentional. Other than needless
confusion, nothing is gained by claiming as could plausibly be claimed in
civilian jurisdictions that the defendant intentionally killed the victim when
the defendant collided with the victim.
The normative appeal of the multinary approach to mental states may also
be illustrated by the Hall case.
clearly worthy of significant condemnation, it would be odd to punish this
killing as severely as a purposeful killing. On the other hand, it seems unfair to
punish actors who are aware of the risk created by their conduct in the same
way as actors who are unaware of the risks that their conduct creates. As a
result, it is appropriate to punish those who are aware of the risk of harm created
by their conduct less than those who want to cause the harm but more than those
who are unaware of the risk of harm they create. This can easily be achieved
under a multinary approach to mental states, such as the one adopted in the
153. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2 210.4.
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MPC. Thus, the defendant in Hall
which is punished less severely than purposeful or knowing murder but more
harshly than negligent homicide.154
This sensible outcome is difficult to achieve if one follows a binary
approach to mental states. If the Hall case were tried in Spain, for example, the
trier of fact would have only two options. She could either convict the
defendant of homicide committed with dolus (intent) or of negligent
homicide.155 Since the unitary mental state of dolus encompasses both
purposeful killings and killings with dolus eventualis, if the defendant is found
to have acted with dolus eventualis, he will be punished as severely as if he had
killed purposely.156 Furthermore, since the unitary mental state of culpa
includes both conscious negligence (without indifference) and unconscious
negligence, if the defendant is found to have acted with culpa, he will be
punished equally regardless of whether he was aware or unaware of the risks
that his conduct created.157 These solutions to the Hall case are objectionable.
If the defendant in Hall was aware that his irresponsible skiing created a risk of
death, he should be punished more severely than a skier who was unaware that
her conduct created such risks but less severely than a skier who wanted to
cause the death of a fellow skier. That the binary approach to mental states
adopted in the Spanish Penal Code and in most civilian jurisdictions does
not allow for such an intuitive conclusion reveals a significant flaw in the
approach.
G. Attitudinal v. Cognitive Mental States in Jury and Bench Cases
The question of whether we ought to prefer an attitudinal or a cognitive
approach to mental states is more difficult to answer than whether we should
favor a binary or multinary approach to mens rea. In principle, it seems that
the attitudinal approach is more normatively attractive. It is plausible to argue
that someone who is aware of the harm created by her conduct and also
indifferent to it is more worthy of condemnation than someone who is aware of
the risk but is not indifferent to it.158

154. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 210 (Colo. 2000); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
155. CÓDIGO PENAL § 1 arts. 138 142 (2015).
156. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 423, 424.
157. Id. at 1018, 1019.
158. It is plausible to argue, however, that an actor who is aware that her conduct creates a risk
of harm but is indifferent towards whether it takes place is not significantly more worthy of blame than
the actor who is similarly aware of the risk but trusts that she will be able to prevent it. Why should
the law favor those who consciously engage in risky undertakings while foolishly believing that harm
will not result?
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In spite of the prima facie normative appeal of the attitudinal approach, at
least two serious pragmatic objections can be leveled against it. First, it will
often be very difficult to prove whether someone was aware of a risk but
indifferent to it or whether she was aware but thought that she could prevent it
and was therefore not indifferent to it. Requiring prosecutors to prove
indifference/acceptance in addition to awareness imposes a probative burden in
circumstances in which it is unclear whether the benefits of doing so outweigh
the evidentiary costs that requiring such proof creates.
Second, jurisdictions that have jury trials may be particularly disserved by
adopting an attitudinal approach to mental states along the lines of the
framework that is in place in civilian countries. If the distinction between dolus
eventualis and conscious negligence has baffled judges and scholars for
decades, it is difficult to imagine how much added confusion it would sow in
the minds of juries. These reservations are buttressed by a recently published
study that showed that laypeople are incapable of non-arbitrarily distinguishing
between recklessness and knowledge.159 If laypeople are unable to consistently
and fairly distinguish knowledge from recklessness, it is fair to infer that they
will be unable to coherently distinguish between recklessness and recklessness
with gross indifference to the value of human life.
For these reasons, adoption of a cognitive approach to mental states is
generally preferable in countries with jury trials. This includes all of AngloAmerica and now includes several civil law countries that have recently
adopted a jury trial system. In contrast, jurisdictions that only have bench trials
may be better served by an attitudinal approach to mental states, given that this
approach is arguably more normatively appealing than a purely cognitive one
and that the pragmatic difficulties inherent in its implementation are easier to
overcome if experienced lawyers are called to apply the framework as opposed
to inexperience laypeople.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay compared and contrasted the American and civilian approaches
to punishing culpable mental states. Two important insights emerge from this
comparative analysis. First, it is preferable to have multiple forms of
culpability than to have only two. The bipartite distinction between dolus and
culpa fails to fully make sense of our moral universe. Second, the criminal law
ought to take attitudinal mental states into account when making grading
distinctions. Nevertheless, there are significant obstacles to doing so in

159. Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1338 (2011).
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jurisdictions with jury trials, as the addition of attitudinal mental states may
confuse laypeople rather than help them.

* * *

